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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
TONY PECHARICH,
Applicant and Appellant,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COmfiSSION
OF UTAH and THE INDEPENDENT
COAL & COKE. COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since there were three hearings in this matter
it will be necessary when referring to the transcript
in this brief to designate which transcript is referred to. Therefore, when the term of "Tr." is
used it is understood that the transcript of the first
hearing is referred to and when the term "'2nd Tr."
is used it is understood that it refers to the tranSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

script of the second hearing and when the tenn '' 3rd
is us.ed it is understood that it refers to th~
transcript of the third hearing.

~Tr.''

Tony Pecharich was a track layer for the Independent Coal & Coke Company. He used some
kind of an instrument called a rail bender to bend
the tracks. (Tr. 7).
On August 6, 1937 about 11 :30 A. M. of said
day, about one year after he started to work for
said coal company, he was engaged on a track
attempting to bend a rail with the rail bender when
the rail crystalized and broke. He had his whole
weight in use at the time of the breaking of the rail,
which caused him to fall backwards upon the rail.
His spine, from the buttocks to the neck, came into
contact with said rail. He was in the mine at the
time an~ his light went out. The man who was helping him jumped and pulled h1m to the side and
asked him if he got hurt. He was dazed and temporarily knocked unconscious. Some water was
given him and after some little while the mine foreman took him outside the mine. (Tr. 6, 9, and 10).
He told the mine foreman that he believed he
could make it to his house, which was 3 or 4 blocks'
away. He was not able to see the doctor until
about 5:00 o'clock that evening. He was taken to
Dr. Roy ·W. Robinson, the company doctor, who
examined the applicant and found his back bruised
and tender in the lumbar sacral region. He strapped
up applicant's back, after which applicant was
taken home. (Tr. 11, 38 and 39).
The applicant from that time continued to
suffer with pains in his back, both in the lower and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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upper part. After about a week, namely on August
13, 1937, :Mr. Pecharich returned to work on the
advice of Dr. Robins.on. However, he continued to
suffer with pain and found it hard for him to carry
on his work. He received some assistance, but the
foreman from time to time complained about his
not being able to do the work and on or about February 1, 1938 he was discharged by the defendant
company. The applicant has never been well since
the accident. (Tr. 27 and 2d Tr. 9, 10, 16, 17, 23.,
24 and 27). After this Dr. J. C. Hubbard attended
him and treated him for rheumatism. The applicnnt was told that he was suffering from rheunlatism, but owing to the fact that he had an impression that rheumatism was not compensible he
did not make application for compensation before
the Industrial Commission immediately. It seemed
that Dr. Hubbard could not find out the real cause
nf the continued suffering of the ~applicant. He
sent the applicant to Salt Lake where he was examined by doctors, but it was not until the spring
of 1939 that any X-rays were taken. The applicant
was advised some time before to get X-rays, but
he did not have any money to pay for them. Finally, however, through the efforts of Dr. Harrow,
nt Salt Lake, the defendant company agreed to
8tand the expense of X-rays. It was after the
X-rays were taken and it was discovered that the
applicant was suffering from hypertrophic osteo
arthritis of the dorsal and lumbar spine that the
~applicant made application to the Industrial Commission for compensation. The date of the appHcation was May 26, 1939. About the same time the
applicant called on and was examined by Dr. A. K.
Bramwell, a chiropractor at Price and Dr. George
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A. Wilson, a chiropractor at Salt Lake City. These
two chiropractors. found that he was suffering from
a sub-luxation of the spine caused by trauma. Both
of these chiropractors testified that in their opinion
the applicant's present condition is a result of the
injury sustained. (Tr. 55 and 3rd Tr. 45). ~rhere
were also X-rays taken to ascertain the condition
of one of the applicant's elbows and knees. These
did not show any evidence of arthritis in those
joints.
The employment by the defendant company
was admitted. It was also admitted that the injury took place and that the wages. of the applicant were an amount sufficient to entitle him to
maximum compensation if the case is compensible.
There is no dispute about the fact that the applicant had four minor children at the time of the
accident.
The hearings were not had before the commissioners or any of them, but were had beforP
what is called hy the commission in their decision
an "examiner." The commission found that
applicant is, and has been, suffering from hyp-ertrophic osteo arthritis of the dorsal and lumbar
spine and has since February 4, 1938 been totally
disabled as a result of said arthritis. They further
found that the disability was not caused and thRt
the cause thereof was not proximately contributed
to by the accident. On January 25, 1940 the commission denied applicant's claim for compensation and
within 30 days thereafter a motion for rehearing
was made on behalf of the applicant, hut on February 26, 1940 said motion was denied by said commission.
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH
APPLICANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL
OF THE DECISION AND JUDGME,NT OF
THE INDUSTRIAL COMnliSSION:
1.
That the commission erred in denying applicant's application for compensation.

2.
rrhat the commission erred in deciding that said
arthritis was not caused or proximately contributed
to by the accident.
3.
That the commission exceeded its authority and
had no power to appoint an examiner to hear the
evidence.
4.

That the so-called exannner had no authority
to administer oaths.

5.
That all of said hearings before said exannner
were void and of no effect because of lack of jurisdiction.
6.
That said commission erred in denying applicant's motion for rehearing.

ARGUMENT
Errors listed as one and two will be discussed
together.
The applicant claims that the Industrial Commission in denying compensation acted arbitrarily
and capriciously and that its decision is a result
of surmise. It is the writer's purpose to show this
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:Court that reasonable men, if doubts are resolved
in favor of applicant, could not differ on the question that the accident if not causing the applicant's
present disability, at least lighted up and aggravated an arthritic condition which previously
existed.
Is there any substantial evidence to show that
the accident did not cause or aggravate the disease
other than opinion evidence? One can search the
record and he will find none. Dr. Ralph Richards
seems to be quite positive in his own opinion that
the accident had nothing to do with the applicant's
present condition. This, however, is only his opinion. The physical facts to the eyes of any layman
show that he is in error. One may testify that
this paper is black. He may be an expert on paper
and through some error or misconception still testify that this paper is black when in truth and in
fact it is white. The physical facts from all of the
surrounding circumstances may prove the error of
such a statement. Dr. Richards is not a bone specialist and he so admitted, although he has had
many bone cases as any general practitioner would.
At the same time he has not specialized in the
bone.
Is there any substantial evidence to show that
the accident did eam;;e or ag·gravate the disease
other than opinion evidence 1 The transcripts are
filled with such evidence. Tony Pecharich testified that he was well before the accident. Josephine
Pecharich, his wife, testified that outside of the
time he had flu and was sick a little bit in 1918
that he has never been sick. That prior to the accident he had never suffered from any pains in the
back and that before the accident he never suffered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from rheumatism. :Mary Palady and J olm Palady
testified to the same affect. ( Tr. 68 and 70).
Charles Bezyack, who ha~ known the applicant for
15 years, said that prior to the accident, to his
knowledge, that Tony Pecharich never had rheumatism and that he was well and a hard worker and
that before that time he neYer con1pla.ined of his
health. (Tr. 97). Joe Kochevar said that he has
known the applicant for 10 years and that prior to
J\.ugust 6, 1937 he was in good health. (Tr. 101).
),[ark Patrick testified that before the accident the
applicant's health was good. (2d Tr. 8). Mrs.
Millie Pascual testified that she knew the applicant for three years and that before the accident
he was engaged in hard work and was a fairly
stout man and that she often wished her hushand
was as stout as he was. (2d Tr. 22).
All of these witnesses also testified that ever
since the accident !ir. Pecharich has not been well,
that he has been suffering and has continued to go
down hill physically. There is no substantial evidence from any of the other witnesses that theapplicant was not in good health before the accident.
Mr. James Collins, who at the time of the hearing
and at· the time of the accident was an employee of
the defendant company, testified that Mr. Pechnrich was slower than the rest of them in his walking and that when he sat down to work he put his
legs under him. He said he thought that was
peculiar because he did not do it. (3rd Tr. 56 and
57). This could not be considered very substantial
evidence for the reason that Collins is an employee
of the defendant company and could have easily
been mistaken concerning the time when he saw·
him walk and sit. No doubt when he saw this it
was after the accident when he came hack on the
job. Dr. Hubbard said something about the fact
that he treated him for rheumatism before the
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accident, but on further examination it was brought
out that he had the impression the accident happened ·in September, 1938 instead of 1937. He also
testified that he took out Mr. Pecharich's teeth, but.
he, no doubt, is in error on this point because of the
fact that Mr. Pecharich testified that he was in
Nevada at the time his teeth were taken out in 1935.
(Tr. 72 and 106). The evidence shows that the ill..,
ness and pain of the applicant has been continuous
since the accident. The defendant company has not
shown any other thing that has caused his present
condition.
A case which seems to the writer to be in
point on this question is
Andreason et al. v. Industrial Commission
et al., reported in 100 P. (2d) 202
and decided by the Supreme- Court of Utah on
March 13, 1940. In that case the applicant had been
suffering from a disease which came on while he
was employed by the Colorado By-Products Company. This Court reversed the Industrial Commission's denying of compensation on the theory
that it was affirmatively shown that the applicant
had no outside contacts with diseased animals or
diseased matter and that since he was working for·
a company where those contacts might have been
had that the presumption was that the disease was
oo.used while in the course of his employment.
The writer doe.s not think that this Court will
R11stain a rule that. all the defendant has to do is
to get a doctor to testify positively that in his
opinion the accident had nothing to do with the
applicant's present condition, in order to be entitled to a denial of compensation; not when thr
glaring and outstanding facts show otherwise.
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A case interesting on this point is one entitled
Wroten v. \Voodley Petroleum Company
decided in the State of Louisiana in
1929 and reported at 12± So. 542 :
Plaintiff was injured June 18, 1928 by falling
a distance of about eight feet. He bruised his side,
back and right shoulder and continued to suffer
pain. Compensation was paid to August 1, 1928.
It was later discovered that plaintiff had arthritis
and the court looked as to the state of plaintiff's
health before the accident.
The following was said by the Court on page
543:
"\Ve realize that the mere fact that a workman has sustained an injury which produces immediate disability is found some
time after the accident to be afflicted with
a disease, which may have resulted from
the accident, does not raise any presumption that the accident caused the disease;
however, when, in- addition to the circumstances stated, it is shown that the workman was in good health prior to the
accident without any symptoms of disease, and that the illness or pain immediately following; the accident had been continuous, we think the presumption should
be that the accident caused the disease, and
that the workman is entitled to compensation for the resu.lting disability.''
The judgment was affirmed.
Another Louisiana case
Patrick v. Grayson & Yeary et al, decided
in 1930 and reported at 127 So. 116,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the plaintiff was injured by a st.rain when attempting to crank an engine. The Court held that an
arthritic condition had been accelerated and plaintiff was entitled to compensation for disability
partly caused by the arthritis.
As to when a witness may not be disbelieved
or disregarded is set forth in the case of
Rukavina et al v. Industrial Commission,
decided in the Supreme Court of Utah
in 1936 and reported at 248 P., page
1103.
On page 1106 the Court states as follows:
''The contention made is in the .affirmative, but that the commission arbitrarily
disbelieved and dis.regarded such testimony,
especially the testimony of the mother and
of one of the children. It may readily be
conceded that on a trial of issues of fact
the co:m.mJissio'n, like ·any other trier of
fact, whether court or jury, is the sole judge
of the facts, and the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their
testimony; still, like a court or jury, the
commission is required to take as true undisputed or uncontradicted testimony or
eviednce, if not opposed to probabilities
or common knowledge, or not contrary to
natural or physical law, or inherently improbable, or inconsistent with facts and
circumstances in evidence, or contradictory
in itself, or the witness from whom comes.
the testimony impeached or otherwise discredited, or the testimony comes from thos.e
indirectly interested, and from the nature
of things it is impossible to secure oppoR.ing
testimony, as where a witness. testifies that
a person made a statement or declaration
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not in the presence of anyone except the
witness and since deceased. If one of these,
or an equivalent, is made to appear, of
course the testimony of a witness may not be
disbelieved or di&regarded. In other words,
the commission may not, any more than a
court or jury, arbitrarily or capriciously
disbelieve or disregard testimony or evidence."
In the case of
Milford Copper Co. of Utah, et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., decided in
the Supreme Court of Utah in 1922
and reported at 210 P., page 993, 61
Utah 37,
the term ''substantial evidence'' is defined on page
994 as follows:
''By 'substantial evidence' is not meant
that which goes beyond a mere 'scintilla
of evidence,' since evidence may go beyond
a mere scintilla and yet not be substantial evidence. Substantial evidence must
possess something of substance and relevant consequence and not consist of vague,
uncertain, or irrelevant matter, not carrying the quality of proof or having fitness
to induce conviction. Substantial evidence
is such that reasonable men may fairly
differ as to whether it establishes plaintiff's case, and, if all reasonable men must
conclude that it does. not establish such
case, then it is not substantial evidence."
This case wa.s one where the deceased was hurt
by lwing jerked down the incline of a stope. He
at once became sick and became progressively
worJole until he died some time later. The physicians testified that he died from pneumonia and
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,that this rarely develops in a short time from
trauma. Their testimony was further that it was not
1mpos.sible for it to do so. In sustaining the award
of the Industrial Commission the Supreme Court
said:
''From the evidence disclosed by the record here no just inference can be drawn
but that an injury from ,accident either
was the sole cause of lobar pneumonia or
that it so accelerated that disease that ultimately death ensued. Upon either theory
claimants were legally entitled to an
award.''
In the case of
Roussel v. Coloni~l Sugar Co., Louisiana
(1933) ; 147 So. 75,
plaintiff suffered from a fall on June 11, 1930 relsulting in a fracture of the left wing of the sacrum
and an injury to the lumbar spine. He was treated
and paid compensation until N ovemher 18, 1930,
when he was pronounced cured and ordered to return to work. He was given light work and performed that work until May 2, 1931. He learned
that he was going to be laid off with others in the
plant. On May 25, 1931 he made application for
compensation. On April30, 1931 X-rays were taken
and it ~was found that the plaintiff had hypertrophic arthritis of the spine. The defendant's
medical testimony was to the effect that when
plaintiff returned to work in November, 1930 he
was con1pletely healed. The Court held that the
''preponderance of the evidence shows that
the arthritis was the result of the injury
and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to
recover.''
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The lay eYidence showed plaintiff was well before
the accident but since the accident he constantly complained of pain and ill health.
In the case of
Behan v. John B. Honor Co .• Ltd., P1 al.
(Louisiana, 1918); 78 So. 589,
plaintiff injured himself by falling into a river upon
some wooden piling. The defense was that the
disability of plaintiff was not caused by the accident but '"as the result of a disease that was. in his
system before the accident. There was evidence
tllat the plaintiff after the accident was suffering
from locomotor ataxia and medical evidence was
that
''an accident such as the one on which this
suit is founded could not, of itself, have
produced that disability. But it also
appears from the expert testimony that the
one and only disease that does cause locomotor ataxia can remain dormant and undiscovered in the human sys.tem a very
long time.'' . . . There is no proof in this
case that the plaintiff would be now or
ever disabled by locomotor ataxia if the
accident he complains of had not happened.
On the contrary, until the accident he was
apparently in ordinary s.ound health,'' . . .
''The injuries he suffered by the accident,
and the immediate change in his physic.al
condition, leave no reasonable doubt that
the accident superinduced, and was the
proximate cause of, the disability of which
he complains."
Judgn1ent for the plaintiff was sustained.
In the case of
Gable v. State Commission, decided in West
Virginia in 1932, reported 162 S. E.
314,
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compensation was refused by the State Compensation Commission on the ground that the applicant's
disability was not caused by· the injury.
February 6, 1931 the applicant was pinned under a load of coal. His sons lifted it off of him and
after lying down for a while he resumed, and continued his work for about 30 days when he became
unable to work longer. It is the evidence that,
while he worked after the injury he was unable to
do as much work as formerly a month or more ,after
the accident. X-rays were taken and it was found
that there were no bones fractured in shoulder or
back where he claim~d to be suffering but that he
was suffering from arthritis. The doctor found no
external marks of injury in March following accident. One doctor (the company physician) testified that the injury could cause arthritis.
The Court ·remarked that the applicant was
able bodied before the accident, had been working
for the company for six years without the loss of
a day on account of sickness.
The Court held the applicant was entitled to
all reasonabJe inferences in his favor and reversed
the commission.
In the case of
Sunnyside Mining Co. v. Industrial Cornmission et al, 151 N. E., 238 Supreme
Court of Ill (192'6),
the applicant was injured by being pushed against
the side of a wall by a car in a mine. There was
some question in the case whether or not there had
been an accident at all. The mine clerk testified
that the applicant had said he was off from work
a short while because of rheumatism and had not
mentioned an accident. The commission, however,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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held that he had an accident and awarded compensation. The doctor testified that in his opinion
applicant had a long standing arthritic condition all
up and down his gpine and further that it was not
due to traun1a. However, the Supreme Court sustained the award on the ground there was sufficient
evidence that the injury aggravated the condition.
In the case of
Hanlon v. Gulf Refining Co. et al, Penn.
(1934), 175 Atl. 724,
plaintiff injured his knee by falling. It was found
he was suffering from arthritis after the accident
and he became totally disabled. There was very
little, if any, medical testimony. The Court said,
''However, in cases of this character:,. proof
of the relation of cause and effect as to
the accident and the bodily condition does
not depend entirely upon professional testimony, whether1 of fiact or of opinion,"
. . . Quoting Baldrige the Court said:
''Taking into consideration the plaintiff's
condition before and after the accident,
his claim was strengthened by the natural
sequence of events.''
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
In the case of
Bryant v. Department of Labor and Industries, Supreme Court of Washington (1933), 22 Pacific ( 2d) 667,
the plaintiff was injured on November 25, 1930.
He was paid compensation from time to time up
to the early part of 1931. In that year, after complete examination by three doctors appointed by
the hoard, they recommended that the claimant
had already received adequate compensation for any
disability resulting from his injury. They dis-
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covered an arthritic condition of the spine, but reported that it was not caused by the injury.
On January 11, 1932 the Department of Labor,
·and Industries refused to make any additional
award. It seems that there had been six doctors
who tes.tified that the arthritis was not due to the
injury. Two doctors, however, testified that the
arthri:ffic co!Ildition 'in \the spine, appellant never
having suffered such pains prior to injury, was
due to the injury. An appeal was taken to the
Superior Court. This: Court reversed the board's
ruling and allowed additional awards. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
commented on the fact that one of the doctors testified that ''when the arthritic condition was strictly
1ocal and not general in the bony joints of the body,
·he did not consider it caused by focal infection, but
that his personal opinion was. that it was due to the
injury.''
The Supreme Court held that the Superior
Court was
''warranted in accepting the evidence of
a few expert witness.es as to the cause and
degree of disability as against several.''
The judgment of the Superior Court was
affirmed.
In the ca.se of
Ray v. Department of Labor and Industries, Supreme Court of Washington,
(1934), 33 Pac. (2d) 375,
the plaintiff was injured February 13, 1933 in the
region of the right hip. He was granted compenS·ation from February 19, 1933 to May 10, 1933.
On the last named date the claim was closed by the
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board. The Superior Court reversed the board
and an appeal was made to the Supreme Court .
.The Supreme Court said that there is but
''one question presented upon the appeal,
and that is whether Ray's disability was
due to the injury or a pre-existing arthritic
condition, and this is purely a question of
fact. The evidence shows that, at the time
he sustained the injury, he had an arthritic condition which was dormant or latent,
and 'that the injury caus.ed this to become
lighted up and made active.''
The Court further said:
"The fact that the claimant, at the time
of the injury, had an arthritic condition
which was dormant and inactive, would not
justifv the refusal of compensation. If that
condition was lighted up and made active
by the injury, then the condition was the
re~mlt of the jn]ury, and not of the previous
arthritic condition."
The judgment of the Superior Court was
a! finned.
In the case of
Brittain v. Department of Labor and Industries, Supreme Court of Washington (1934), 35 P. (2d) 49,
·on No:vember 7, 1930 the plaintiff was injured,
but got better and his case was. closed on December'
30, 1930.
On April 2, 1932 he received another injury.
He appealed to the Department for compensation.
Some compensation was granted but the case later
closed on the theory that he had a pre-existing con-
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dition of osteo~arthritis to which, it was claimed,
his present condition resulted. The Superior Court
then had a hearing and reversed the Department,
whereupon the board appealed to the Supreme
Court.

•

The Court said in its opinion, among other
things:
''The appellant seems to have relied almost
exclusively upon the reported testimony
of its assistant medical adviser to the effect
that respondent had the pre-existing disease of arthritis, which, in his opinion, was
the cause of respondent's disability. His
conclusion rested largely on an examination he claims to have made of which he
says that the arthritis was caused by infected tonsils) pyorrhea, and enlarged
postate, which induced infection of the
gland. His testimony .and conclusions
were essentially and directly contrary to
all the other testimony.
The record shows that respondent weighed
about 180 pounds. He testified that he was
forty-five years of age, had worked hard
all his life, the last six years as a logger
- bucking logs in the woods - and before
that had been a farmer; that prior to his
first injury he never had a pain in his back,
nor suffered from rheumatism in any part
of his. body; that he had never liad any disease, nor been confined in the hospital; that
after his injuries, especially the second one,
he got worse and soon was. unable to do
a goqd day's work, even in his garden, and
thnt one hip and leg became weak, and that
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such disability was caused by his accidental
injuries.''
The judgment of the Superior Court wa.s
affirmed.
In the case of
~leQuire v. Department of Labor and Industries, Supreme Court of Washington (1934), 38 P. (2d) 266,
the plaintiff was injured by some sort of strain
while working with a 125-lb. jack-hammer. At the
time he had an immediate pain in the upper lumbar
vertebrae. He said that is the only trouble he had.
The claimant was sent by the Depa.rtment to~
physicians to be examined) and these physicians reported that claimant had an arthritic condition of
the spine. Their testimony was in effect that his
present condition had nothing to do with the injury. After the reports were in, the joint board
sustained the action of the Department in closing
the claim. It was appealed to the Superior Court,
which sustained the Department's decision. The
evidence showed that the arthritis was progressively getting worse. The following is taken from the
case:
''Prior to the accident, the claimant had
engaged in the hardest kind of manual
labor, such as pushing a wheelbar1·ow filled
with cement up an incline, which work he
did without suffering any pain or inconvenience. He was., even though fifty-two
years of age, robust and vigorous. As to
his previous condition, the claimant is supported, not only by the tes.timony of his
wife, but by the testimony of two disinterested witnesses. The medioal testimony, so far as it touches the question, is
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that, if the claimant's arthritis had been
active, manual labor would have caused
him to suffer pain in his hack.
The medical testimony offered by the
claimant was to the effect that, prior to
the accident, the arthritic condition was
dormant or inactive, and that it was lighted
up and made active by the accident. The
physicians generally seem to agree that in
many persons of the age of the claimant
there is an arthritic condition which causes
no inconvenience until something happens
which causes it to become active. Five or
six doctors who had examined the claimant, either by report to the Department or
testimony before an examiner, gave it as
their opinion that the claimant's condition
was the result of the prior arthritic condition, and that had it not been for that
condition his diahility would have been for
a comparatively brief period of time. None
of these doctors, however, express any
opinion upon the vital question of fact in
the case, and that is, whether the arthritic condition prior to the accident was
active or inactive. In answering questions
as to the extent of the partial permanent
disability resulting solely from the injury,
had there been no pre-existing arthritis,
the doctors necessarily, not only passed
upon a question of fact, but upon a question of law. Without knowing their opinion on the matter of whether the arthritis
was active or inactive prior to the injury,
their reports and testimony do not reach
the real question in the case. We find no
evidence in the case bearing upon the quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion, which overcomes the eYidenee offered~
by the claimant, from which it would seem
to irresistibly follow that the arthritic
condition prior to the accident was dormant
or inactive.''
The judgment of the Superior Court wa.s re'Versed and the cause remanded to that Court to
overrule the order of the joint board of the Department and to allow the claim.
In the case of
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company, et al.
v. Slocum, Supreme Court Oklahoma~
(1932), 15 P. (2'd) 29,
the applicant was injured on April 29, 1930 by
stepping off a barrel with a 75-lb. steam, valve.
He had the steam valve on his shoulder and walked
down sort of a stair made of barrels, each staJ r
being waist high. When he stepped on to the
cement floor from the last barrel he noticed a pull
or strain of hi8 left thigh. He continued work that
day and until 12:00 noon the following day.
There was considerable testimony to the affect
that the applicant did not claim to be hurt, claiming that the pain began in the night. He •was hos-pitalized for· 66 days and was later awarded considerable compensation. There were a great number of doctors who testified that he had arthritis
in the left hip caused by infection unrelated to
trauma. One doctor, however, testified that he attributed the cause of Slocum's disability to infectious arthritis occasioned by trauma resultant
from the act of walking down the barrel stairway.
The Supreme Court sustained the a ward of the
Industrial Commission.
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In the case of
Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. Industrial Commission et al., Supreme
Court of Ill. (1924), 142 N. E. 498,
applicant was well before the accident which
occurred on January 29, 1921. When pushing a coal
car he fell in such a manner as to strike his spine
on a bumper. Radiographs showed osteo-arthritis
of the spine and the physicians testified that the
condition was of several years standing, and that
trauma might excite a dormant diseas.ed condition.
Judgment for applicant affirmed.
According to the case of
Carlson v. E. H. Shelson & Co. et al.,
decided in the Supreme Court of
Michigan, 1933 and reported at 251
N. E. 369,
the defendant has to show by competent testimony
that the applicant after the compensible injury is
no longer incapacitated. In that case plaintiff's
arm was struck by a board and it was injured. He
went back to work after being paid compensation
.and was later laid off work. He made application
for further compensation to the Department of
Labor and Industry. Compensation was denied.
It developed that he had arthritis in the region of
the elbow. The Supreme Court reversed the Department of Labor and Industries saying:
"We do not believe that there is any testimony showing that plaintiff is no longer incapacitated as a result of his original injury."
Since Dr. Richards' opinion was that there was
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no evidence to show that his present condition was
a result of the injury, the case of
Perry Coal Company v. Industrial Comm!ssion et al., Supreme Court of Ill.
(19:28), reported 163 N. E. 681,
is an interesting case to show that lay testimony
sometimes over:oomes that of medical testimony.
Plaintiff was injured by falling on a tie. Doctor
contended there was no evidence of injury. The
Court said:
"The testimony of Roberts as to his injury
and as to his inability to work since October 18, 1924, is not overcome by the testimony of the witnesses . . . that flieir examination disclosed no physical evidence of
·
an injury.''
Examination showed the applicant had hypertrophic osteo-arthritis, with fixation of all his lumbar vertebrae. The applicant was doing his work
before the accident but was totally disabled after
the accident. The Court sustained the award for
the applicant with this statement:
''The diseased physical condition of the
employee is immaterial where the accidental
injury is the proximate .cause of his physical condition.''
:Medicine is not an exact science, and even under those conditions, to get the best results some
sort of process of elimination should be used. For
instance in order to prove that a condition existing
is a traumatic arthritis it is necessary that several
joints of the body be X-rayed as well as the part
involved. (3rd Tr. 24).
X-rays of the elbow and knee were taken and
all the testimony shows tha.t there is no arthritic
condition there.
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It is admitted that the most frequent cause of
hypertrophic arthritis is not infection but trauma.
(3d Tr. 18). Is it not probable that the trauma
.caus.ed the increase of symptoms in this case~
If the decision of the Industrial Commission is
a result of surmise it should be reversed. That is
lthe holding, of the Court on numerous occasions.
What is the meaning of the word ''surmise.'' Web;,sfer 's dictionary states it as follows: ''To imagine
without certain knowledge ;to infer on slight grounds;
to suppose or conjecture.'' Should not the applicant be given the benefit of any doubts? The report of the referee referred to as No. 25 in the
documents will be found a statement which is interesting in this respect. He states. in the last par,agraph of his report, ''I am frankly in some doubt
about the matter. However, I think I should be
inclined to a denial were I called upon to make the
decision myself.'' Thus it appears clearly, that so
far as those recommendations are concerned the
referee is giving not the plaintiff but the defendant
the benefit of the doubt.
Again I call the Court's attention to the fact
before the accident ~1:r. Pecharich was an able
bodied and strong man. After the accident he
could not do the work properly. (Tr. 13· and 14).
He worked regularly before the accident and was
healthy for about 25 years. (Tr. 24, 25, 26, 27, 42,
47, 68, 69, 97, 101 and 102; 2d Tr. 7, 8, 21, 2'2,
27 and 34). He was very seldom out of work
since 1912. He did hard physical labor and had
never been sick except in 1918 ·when he was out of
work about eight days because of flu. (Tr. 27). He
never had rheumatism in his life before the accident. (Tr. 27, 68 and 107). Charles. Bezyack, who
had been secretary of the Austrian Lodge, said
~that
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that he has known the applicant for fifteen years
and he never had rheun1atism before August 6, 1937
a.nd that he did not report through the Lodge, while
he was secretary, which was at least during the
year 1937, that Pecharich had rheun1atism. (Tr.
!l6, 97 and 98). Dr. A. R.. Demman testified that in
his opinion the injury was the cause of applicant's
present condition and that even though he had
osteo-arthritis before the accident tbat the accident
aggravated it. (Tr. 90). Dr. George A. \Vilson and
Dr. A. K. Bramwell testified to practically the same
thing as stated above. Dr. :Martin C. Linden, wit~
ness for the defendant, testified that
"If the trauma had been great enough, it is
possible and most probable that a severe
injury to the spine, without the presence of
arthritis deformans, might cause it." (3rd
Tr. 37 and 38).
There is no dispute about the fact that applicant received an injury to the spine of sufficient
force to require it to b~ taped and to cause bruises
and contusions.
There is no dispute about the fact that tberPwas a subluxation of the vertebrae, in the atlas region, in the region of the fourth lumbar and in the
region of the sacrum. (2d Tr. 45, 46 and 48).
Errors numbered 3, 4 and 5 are similar, therefore, they will be discussed together.
Section 42-1-11 of Compiled Laws of Utah,
1933,
provides that the commission may employ ''examIners." Upon reading that section it can be readily
seen that it refers to the administrative work and
not to th~ judicial work of the commission.
If they have power to appoint a third party
to sit in a hearing for them it would no doubt come
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under Section 42-1-29 of said compiled laws. That
section provides that the commission shall have
power to appoint agents for the ''purpose of making any investigation with regard to any employment or place of employment.'' It does not provide for these agents to take evidence as referees
in compensation hearings. Even though such
authority was given by that section it does not
:appear from the files and records in this case
either that such appointment was made by the commission by "an order in writing'' as provided in
said section, or that the referee before proceeding
with the evidence was "sworn well and truly to
hear and determine the facts'' as provided in Section 104--27-7 of s.aid compiled laws. The commis'sioners themselves and the judges have to be properly sworn to well and truly perform their duties.
·Why should a less obligation he placed upon the
referee or examiner. He certainly could not carry
much weight in attempting to deliver oaths. He had
no authority to administer oaths as he did in this
case. (Tr. 67 and 86).
Is not there a reason for the rule adopted by
the Supreme Court that the Industrial Commission
shall he triers of the facts 1 Is not this reason that
ithey are, as in the case of any trial court, better
1able to get at the truth than would be the Supreme
;Court~ The Supreme Court has only the written
evidence before it while the triers of the facts can
see .and hear the witnesses, notice the tone of their
.voices, their gesticulations, expressions and demeanor upon the witness stand. In the case at bar
none of the commissioners saw or heard a single
:witness. They were not in near as favorable situa'ition to try the facts as is the Supreme Court. There
were three of them as agninst five in the Supreme
Court a.nd then onJy two of those participated be~ause Commissioner Knerr was ill. Then too, the
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Suprerne Court has the advantages of counsels'
briefs whereas the Industrial Commission had
none. It never was contemplated by the legislature
that the Industrial Commission should delegate an
examiner or referee to try its cases. It certainly
did not contemplate cases being tried by an ag1ent
not under oath.
Thus it appears that the commission acted
without authority in attempting to delegate its
powers to a third party, its decision was capricious
and as a result of surmise, there is no substantial
evidence to support the decision, the great weight
of evidence indicates compensation should be
awarded and it should have granted applicant's
motion for new trial.
Hence the applicant submits that the decision
of the Industrial Commission denying, compensation
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GAYLEN S. YOUNG,
Attorney for Applicant.
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